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Honored colleagues, family, students, friends and guests,
The Pāli Jātaka, a collection of tales narrating the more than 
500 previous lives of the Buddha, tells the story of an ascetic 
who had engaged in long years of extreme deprivation.1 
At a certain point, he wanders down from his abode in the 
Himalayas to the city of Benares, where he takes up residence 
as a guest of the king. Putting the ascetic, who is the future 
Buddha, in the care of the queen, the king leaves to deal with  
a border disturbance. One day, flying through the air with  
his supernatural powers, the ascetic comes to the queen’s 
chamber. Encountering him suddenly, in her surprise she 
drops her robe. When he sees her naked, the text says, “the 
sexual passion dwelling within the ascetic for uncountable 
hundreds of thousands of millions of years sprang up like 
a sleeping poisonous snake in a box, erasing his meditative 
absorption”. What happens next you may well imagine, and the 
two continue in a like manner day after day. This becomes well 
known throughout the town, and the king is informed of it, 
but he does not believe the story. When he returns, he asks his 
wife about the matter, and she tells him the truth. But still he 
does not believe it. He next asks the ascetic. The future Buddha 
then reflects that, although if he were to deny the story the king 
would believe him, “in this world there is no foundation like 
the truth. Those”, he thinks, “who have forsaken the truth may 
sit beneath the Bodhi tree, but they will not be able to attain 
awakening”. The text then offers a remarkable judgment:2 
“While one in pursuit of buddhahood may, under certain 
circumstances, take life, steal, engage in sexual activity,  
or take intoxicants, he does not tell a deceptive lie that  
injures anyone”.
 
Sex and lies - all that’s missing is the videotape. 
I would like to spend my few moments with you today thinking  
about lies. In particular, I would like us to ponder a couple of 
questions: Is Buddhism, which is so very concerned with Truth 
with an upper-case T, correspondingly equally concerned with 
lies? And what might thinking about this question teach us 
about the study of Buddhism more broadly?
Let us begin at the beginning. The earliest datable reference 
to Buddhist literature - in fact, the very earliest reference to 
Buddhism at all - is found in a mid third-century BCE stone 
inscription of the emperor Aśoka.3 This records the emperor’s 
commendation of seven scriptures to the Buddhist monastic 
community. Six are cited merely by title, but the seventh is 
identified as the “Instruction to Rāhula referring to lying”. 
There has been much discussion over the identity of Aśoka’s 
seven texts, some of which may have been lost to us, more 
than 2000 years later.4 But the identity of this seventh text 
is clear; its Pāli version was noticed as early as 1879,5 and a 
corresponding Chinese text identified seventeen years later.6 
In this sermon titled “Rāhula-sūtra”, the Buddha emphatically 
denies the authenticity of the ascetic who is not ashamed 
of an intentional lie. Moreover, he proclaims: “When one is 
not ashamed of an intentional lie, there is no evil he will not 
commit”. The ascetic is thus enjoined to think: “I will speak no 
lie, not even as a joke”, a sentiment repeated in later Buddhist 
literature.7 The “Rāhula-sūtra” continues by arguing that every 
action of body, speech and mind should be done only after 
reflection, after consideration of whether such an action will 
harm either self or others. And here we meet a fundamental 
Buddhist idea, namely that there are three types of action, 
those of body, speech and mind. 
Given my topic today, I should perhaps be cautious about 
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making truth claims. But I do dare to say that the Buddhist 
analysis of action is essentially true - true in the sense that 
it is possible to act with one’s body, with one’s speech and 
with one’s mind, and no other possibilities exist. Through 
this three-fold category, Buddhist philosophical - or, more 
cautiously put, doctrinal - literature of all periods preserves 
some focus on the importance of truthful speech. 
So the only Buddhist text specified by more than a mere title, 
in the earliest reference to Buddhist literature, is a scripture 
concerned with lying. Of course, this need not mean that 
this was the most important of Aśoka’s seven recommended 
sermons. One could equally well argue that the other six were 
so well-known that no further specification of their theme 
was necessary, and it was only the lesser-known sermon on 
lying that required further identification. Or it may be that the 
specification was meant to disambiguate this sermon to Rāhula 
from some other. It is impossible to decide the matter, and we 
must leave it that one among the seven earliest references to 
the teachings of the Buddha dealt with the avoidance of lying. 
This concern with lying continues to resonate down through 
the ages, something that it is not possible to demonstrate today 
at length, but that can be outlined through a brief enumeration 
of several other ‘firsts.’ 
About 400 years after the time of Aśoka appears what is 
commonly thought of as the first Buddhist scripture in China, 
the Sūtra in Forty-two Sections. The exact date of this text 
is unknown, but it existed at least in part by the year 166, as 
discussed by, among others, the late Leiden professor Erik 
Zürcher.8 Near the beginning of this relatively short text, a 
compilation of what we might term ‘sermonettes,’ we read the 
following: “The Buddha said: ‘All beings consider ten things 
as evil. Three concern the body, four the mouth, and three the 
mind. The three of the body are killing, stealing, and sexual 
aberrance. The four of the mouth are duplicity, slander, lying, 
and lewd speech. The three of the mind are envy, hatred, 
and delusion’”.9 So here in the earliest Chinese Buddhism we 
already see evidence of an awareness of lying as one of the 
fundamental negative acts. This does not close our catalogue 
of ‘firsts’, however. For in 1756 appears the first published 
translation of a complete Buddhist scripture into a European 
language, a French rendering of precisely this Chinese Sūtra  
in Forty-two Sections.10 
The Jātaka tale with which I began contained what I called a 
remarkable judgement, that one seeking to become a buddha 
may kill, steal, have sex, or take intoxicants, but he must never 
tell a harmful lie. The allusion here is to the category of the 
Five Precepts, through which one vows to refrain from those 
five actions. These are generally considered to embody the 
most basic Buddhist ethical stance. Fundamental Buddhist 
identity is paradigmatically ritually affirmed through taking 
refuge in the Buddha, in his teaching or dharma, and in his 
community or saṁgha. But vowing to undertake the Five 
Precepts is also considered a basic marker of Buddhist identity, 
and is required of anyone who declares him- or herself a 
Buddhist layperson. 
Our listing of ‘firsts’ continues by noticing that a discussion of 
these five precepts prominently appeared in the first Western 
work to include a partial translation of a Buddhist text, a  
work published in French in Paris and in Amsterdam in 
1691, reprinted in Amsterdam in 1700, 1713 and 1714.11 So this 
Buddhist denunciation of lying as one of the fundamental 
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forms of improper behavior was, interestingly, known even 
here in the Netherlands more than 300 years ago. It was, 
indeed, one of the first facts to be reliably known about 
Buddhism in the West.
Now, while it is obvious that killing and stealing are, shall we 
say, anti-social, and that sexual misconduct and intoxication 
lead one away from spiritual cultivation, what is so bad about 
the fifth of the five restricted acts, lying? And in particular, is  
it worse than slander, another of the ten evils and, as we shall  
see, according to some the ultimate bad action? When the 
Indian scholar Vasubandhu composed his great compendium 
of Buddhist doctrinal systematics, the Abhidharmakośa, in  
the fourth or fifth century of our era, he had an answer.12  
In the context of the five-fold abstention expected of the  
lay Buddhist, Vasubandhu posed the following question: 
“Why is only the abstention from lying speech listed as a rule 
of behavior of the layman’s vows, not the abstention from 
slander and the rest?” His answer is most interesting: “Because”, 
Vasubandhu says, “if he violated all the other rules of behavior, 
he would necessarily lie about it”. And he goes on to say:  
“For whenever one has violated a rule of behavior, when 
questioned about it he would respond: ‘I didn’t act like that!’ 
thus inevitably resulting in lying speech”. The connections to 
earlier sources come full circle a short time later in a similar 
doctrinal treatise, the Abhidharmadīpa.13 Its author follows 
Vasubandhu’s argument closely, then goes on to quote the 
“Rāhula sūtra” passage I cited earlier: “When one is not 
ashamed of an intentional lie, there is no evil he will not 
commit”. For these authors, lying is a fundamental violation, 
not only intrinsically, but also since it serves to conceal any 
other transgressions. 
Would it be fair, then, to say that Buddhism rejects lying as 
inherently harmful, or even that it condemns it categorically? 
Not all texts are so single-minded. A scripture, with the 
probably unintentionally ironic title “Chapter on the Truth-
teller”, relates an episode in which the protagonist, having 
frankly stated to a king the faults of many others, then equally 
frankly expounds on the king’s own faults, most particularly 
that he is quick to anger. The king, not unexpectedly, quickly 
becomes angry, summarily sentencing the truth-speaker to 
death. Begging to be allowed to speak once again, he confesses 
his own fault, namely that he is extremely outspoken. The 
truth- speaker then goes on to say: “Your majesty, a wise person 
does not always say things exactly as they are. A wise person 
understands the appropriate time and place to speak. One who 
speaks correctly does not please or satisfy anyone, because noble 
people will not praise him and stupid people will hate him”.14 
What is to be considered a lie is, of course, a basic problem, 
one much debated by moral philosophers. Among Buddhist 
thinkers, one relevant issue was how to account for seemingly 
inconsistent teachings appearing in Buddhist texts. If the 
Buddha indeed preached all the sermons attributed to him, 
as the tradition maintains, how could he say one thing in one 
place and another in another? Is not one of the contradictory 
statements a lie? The modern scholar is content to speculate 
that the authorship of the conflicting texts may differ, that 
there may be strata of authorship within a given text, and so 
on. But a traditional, system-internal and hermeneutically 
creative answer is that the Buddha employed skillful means, 
upāya, a technique whereby he suited each presentation to 
its audience. There is more than one way to make a truth 
palatable. If one tells a young child whose mother has died, 
“Mommy went on a long trip”, is it a lie?15 Accordingly, some 
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to whom the Buddha preached were, in terms of their spiritual 
maturity, like children, and the Buddha explained his Truth 
to them appropriately. This idea finds its echo in modern 
colloquial Japanese, in the expression 嘘も方便 (uso mo 
hōben), literally “even a lie can be a skillful means”, or more 
loosely, “circumstances may justify a white lie”. In this rather 
watered down fashion, Buddhist hermeneutics finds its way 
even into everyday thinking and speech. 
There is a final aspect to this question of Buddhist attitudes 
toward lies - and implicitly, of the status of truth - I should 
like to mention, before moving on to consider things from 
a different angle. As is well known, all Indian traditions, 
including Buddhism, believe in the magically potent force of 
true speech as a virtually physical agent. Spoken truth can have 
the power to cause supernatural prodigies, to cause rivers to 
flow backwards, for instance. This is what scholars speak of as 
the “Act of Truth”.16 The logic behind this has little to do with 
truth in opposition to lies. Rather, it involves a sort of magical 
oath-taking, whereby the power of one’s verbal commitment 
is given physical force. The most common word for ‘truth’ 
in Sanskrit is satya, and this is used in most expressions of 
the “Act of Truth”. But alongside it and in the same sense we 
sometimes see another word that is likely to be familiar to  
you. This is dharma, the most usual term for the teaching of 
the Buddha. The teaching of the Buddha is dharma as Truth, 
since what the Buddha preaches is precisely his expression of 
the upper-case T “Truth” to which he awoke. The Buddha’s 
dharma is an expression of the way things are, so speech in 
accord with dharma is true speech in this fundamental  
sense, both ontologically and soteriologically, so to speak. 
In Buddhist doctrine, therefore, the opposite of truth is 
not, commonly, lies, but rather ignorance. To see the truth 
is to perceive the dharma, to see reality as it is or - to use an 
expression favored by my first professor of the philosophy of 
religion - to know the really real. The most basic focus of the 
Buddhist tradition is the quest to attain perfection understood, 
yes, certainly also in moral terms. But this morality flows from, 
and is fundamentally motivated by, a perfect appreciation 
of the true nature of reality. In other words, one perfects 
oneself in order to understand the nature of reality, and 
correspondingly it is only that correct understanding of 
the nature of reality that makes perfect behavior possible. 
Fundamentally, therefore, the most basic relationship is that 
between oneself and reality, not that between self and others. 
Interpersonal ethics in a Buddhist context are subordinate to 
self-cultivation - an element of this cultivation, to be sure,  
but subordinate to it. 
I have spoken about some of what Indian Buddhist sources 
have to say about lies. And I have argued, at least implicitly, 
that this is a significant theme in these sources, although few 
modern studies of Buddhism, and even of Buddhist ethics, 
devote any serious attention to the topic.17 My own attention 
was drawn to the issue in the first place by the remarkable 
statement in the Jātaka story I recounted to you earlier. While 
a much more detailed and comprehensive investigation of the 
theme is obviously a desideratum, even at this stage the topic 
provides an opportunity to think about larger issues in the study 
of Buddhism. Let me explore just a few of these with you now.
I would preface what I am about to say by confessing that, in 
general, I have reservations about much comparative work, 
primarily because I think that it tends to extract objects of 
comparison from their organic context, thereby ending up  
8Prof.dr. J.A. Silk
not really comparing at all. That said, certain kinds of 
comparisons can be helpful. On the grandest scale, if we 
recognize religions as fundamentally human constructs, 
comparative studies may be expected to help us discern 
common human features as they appear cross-culturally and 
transhistorically. From another point of view, comparisons can 
focus our attention on overlooked aspects of a given tradition, 
as it were spotlighting them from the outside. In this spirit, 
I have become particularly interested over the past few years 
in investigating how Jewish sources, particularly biblical and 
rabbinic sources, may allow us to deepen our appreciation of 
Buddhist traditions. 
Jewish sources do give attention to questions of correct speech, 
although this attention seems often to focus more on slander 
and injurious speech - understood in general terms as gossip 
- than on lying per se. Biblical literature in particular contains 
examples of famous lies, or apparent lies, such as Abraham’s 
claim to Abimelech that Sarah was his sister, and there is a long 
tradition of apologetics attached to such stories.18 But there are 
also more abstract considerations of the issue. Naturally, even 
if sometimes seemingly artificially, Jewish attitudes are always 
ultimately grounded, at least formally, in biblical statements. 
Common proof texts referring to lying and slander include 
Leviticus 19:11, which states:19 “You shall not dissemble and 
you shall not lie to one another”, meaning that one should 
neither deny a truth, nor affirm a non-truth. The instruction 
in Exodus 23:1 that: “You shall not bear a false rumor” is 
understood by the influential medieval commentator Rashi  
to mean that one should not even listen to gossip, much less 
pass it on oneself, while the Talmud cites the view that “Anyone 
who shames his fellow in public is as if he sheds blood”.20 
Elsewhere the Talmud stresses that gossip is worse even than 
the three fundamental sins of idolatry, sexual immorality 
and murder. For these crimes, it says, one will receive eternal 
punishment in the World-to-Come,21 a view further developed 
by the great twelfth century rabbi-philosopher Maimonides.22 
It is interesting that this view contrasts with the Buddhist 
assertion that lying is the fundamental transgression, 
as I mentioned earlier. This is a point worthy of further 
investigation, though on another occasion. The key word in 
such Jewish discussions is lashon hara, which Maimonides 
defines as: “Anything which, if it would be publicized, would 
cause the subject physical or monetary damage, or would 
cause him anguish or fear”.23 Importantly, this is a classification 
of harmful, but in fact true, speech; when the speech is false, 
it belongs to an even more serious category. What is one to 
do about this? Possible responses are both theoretical and 
practical. Here, I simply refer to one ritual response, although 
it has a psychological dimension as well: Three times a day, 
and four on the Shabbat, observant Jews pray, partially quoting 
Psalm 34:14: “Lord, guard my tongue from evil, my lips from 
speaking lies. Help me ignore those who would slander me”. 
Folk wisdom can convey a moral memorably, and a story 
sometimes attributed to the Chasidic tradition vividly illus-
trates the danger of gossip. Although its relevance to my theme 
is not direct, I cannot resist sharing it with you.24 A man who 
was given to gossip one day realized that he was spreading 
rumors, and sought the rabbi’s advice on how to atone for this 
transgression. “Is there, perhaps”, he asked, “some ritual I could 
perform?” “Indeed,” the rabbi responded, “there is such a ritual. 
Have you a feather pillow at home?” The man assured him 
that, certainly, he possessed such a pillow. “And has your home 
an upper floor, with a window?” Again, the man answered that 
yes, it did. “Go then,” the rabbi said, “and take your feather 
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pillow, along with a knife, to the window of your upper  
floor, slit open the pillow, and scatter the feathers in the 
wind. When you have done that, come back to me.” The man 
assumed that this was some sort of magical ritual. He did as 
he was told, and having done so, returned to the rabbi. “Now,” 
said the rabbi, “go home and pick up every last one of the 
feathers, and return it to the pillow.” And just as the man was 
about to open his mouth to exclaim the total impossibility of 
this task, it hit him: there was no more way for him to return 
the feathers to the pillow than there was for him to retrieve  
the rumors and gossip he had spread. 
This is a beautiful and touching story. Might it, or any of 
the Jewish materials to which I have referred, help us to 
understand Buddhism? Well, if the answer were “no”, I 
probably wouldn’t be up here talking about them. So that  
may be our first lesson: sometimes we know what must be 
going on simply because of context. 
My presentations of both Buddhist and Jewish materials 
on lying and slander have been selective and necessarily 
superficial. My conclusions may be as well, but I would 
certainly like to insist in the first place that these materials 
demand to be taken seriously, not only religiously, but also 
from a scholarly standpoint. Unfortunately, however, the 
study of Buddhism remains something of a poor cousin in the 
academy. I think I know why this has been so in the past, but I 
admit to finding the reasons it continues hard to understand. 
To ignore or underemphasize Buddhism in the study of Asia 
is akin to ignoring Christianity in the history of the West. As I 
stress to my students every term, Buddhism is the only cultural 
force which permits us to speak of Asia as a unity at all. And to 
ignore or underemphasize Asia in a study of the world, which 
is to say, in any examination of human history and culture, or 
to treat Asia only in its relation to Europe, as colonial studies 
has tended to do, is to engage in the worst sort of parochialism. 
It follows that the study of Buddhism should be absolutely 
central to any study of humanity in general. Heretofore, 
however, it clearly has not held such a position. In part, this is 
a legacy of colonialism and of a cultural myopia. I shall have 
nothing more to say about this. But a part of the fault - though 
only a part - surely lies with those of us who work in this field  
of the Study of Buddhism. We have not done enough to consider 
what general lessons may be learned from careful and scientific 
studies. We have not thought intelligently enough about ques-
tions such as those concerning the dynamic relation between 
Church and State in Buddhist frameworks. We have not done 
our job to insure that Buddhist scripture is treated as an 
essential object in general reflections on sacred literature.  
We have not demonstrated how and why philosophical studies 
must take account of Buddhist philosophy - and the list goes 
on and on. In fact, we have not done nearly enough even 
to integrate ourselves and our work into broader studies of 
Religion, and perhaps even into Asian Studies, much less into 
the humanities as a whole.
Let me give you just one example of an arena in which there 
is much room for mutual learning. I have been reading lately 
in biblical and rabbinic text criticism, with something of the 
proverbial mixture of fascination and horror. I am fascinated 
by the prospect of what Buddhist scholars might learn from 
the centuries of research carried out on the relation between 
the Septuagint and its Hebrew basis, and optimistic that this 
might help us make more critical use of Chinese or Tibetan 
translations of originally Indic scriptural texts. But I am also 
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horrified - well, I’m exaggerating: let’s say I am disappointed - 
to learn how contested and vexatious is the study of rabbinic 
text criticism in particular. I had hoped, truth be told, that 
many of the problems which plague the study of Buddhist 
literature would have already found solutions there.  
But interestingly, our situations seem to be rather close.  
Let me read you a short passage:
For many of the classics of rabbinic literature, no proper 
edition of their entire texts, nor even lists of their variae 
lectiones, exist. A comparison to the New Testament or to 
classical literature indicates how embarrassing the situation 
is. Instead of the sanguine possibility of various editors 
arguing about the correct reading, as is the case with the 
New Testament and many works of classical literature, 
scholars of rabbinics consider themselves fortunate when 
manuscript material has been made available, even if the 
citations are haphazard and the method non-critical.25 
Mutatis mutandis, this perfectly characterizes the situation of 
Buddhist Studies. In fact, I would go so far as to say that almost 
no Indian Buddhist scripture has yet received a truly scientific 
treatment. Even the most basic task of simply collecting  
and classifying manuscripts remains almost entirely undone. 
This is often dry work, unsexy and of a kind that funding 
agencies, demanding “relevance” above all, can find hard to 
understand. But without it, the rest is a mere house of cards. 
And this leads me back, in a way, to truth and to lies. I believe 
that we are obliged as scholars - set aside now, as human 
beings - to tell the truth, and not to gossip. One thing this 
means is that, rather than criticize the work of others, if prior 
work is not reliable, let’s quietly sit down and do it right. 
While understanding in scholarship comes about through 
give and take, through sometimes fierce disagreement, the first 
requirement is to honestly confess what it is that we know, and 
what we don’t. And this requires an acknowledgment also of 
the theoretical limits of our knowledge. We can be quite sure, 
for instance, that a great deal of Indian Buddhist literature has  
not survived. Moreover, most of what has survived exists only  
in translation, primarily, as I said earlier, in Chinese and Tibetan.  
Consequently, we know from the outset that when we study 
this literature we cannot reconstruct a complete picture of 
Indian Buddhism. The most we can do is take a scattered jigsaw  
puzzle, many of whose pieces have long been lost, and fashion 
some sort of coherent and, one would hope, compelling image 
out of what remains. The question is: How can we go about 
making the most of the evidence that we do have? 
We must start at the beginning. If we would like to be able to 
understand what Buddhist authors meant, we need to know 
what these authors actually said. There is a word for the one 
and only valid approach to this task, a term mysteriously in 
disfavor in some quarters these days, being seen perhaps as 
old-fashioned, stodgy or insufficiently theoretical. This word  
is philology, the scientific study of texts. 
I confess to you that I am a positivist. I believe that there is 
right and wrong, that not every reading of a text is a valid 
reading, that some evidence is better and some worse. I 
consequently insist on basing textual scholarship on sources 
which have been forged in the crucible of the philological 
furnace. Let me be less poetic. We must establish a text before 
we imagine we can know what its author meant. To establish 
a text we need to consider all sources; we need to collect and 
collate and compare and to judge. We cannot simply take any 
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printed book off our shelves - or heaven forbid, from some 
website! - and naively accept it as “the text”. And we must 
consider too what the tradition itself says about this text and 
its meaning. While it is not a matter of all or nothing, but 
rather of gradual and incremental progress, in this respect, 
scholars of Indian Buddhism are centuries behind critical 
biblical scholars. Yet, challenges are opportunities. Simply as 
one almost random example, I cannot help but feel some envy 
when I read the pages that Emanuel Tov devotes to bilingual 
concordances in his Text-Critical Use of the Septuagint in 
Biblical Research26 since few comparable works exist for us 
in Buddhist Studies. But I also feel giddy with excitement, 
for to a very great extent, the field of the comparative study 
of Buddhist Sanskrit literature and its Tibetan or Chinese 
translations is unplowed ground. The very immaturity of 
our field guarantees a bountiful harvest to those who would 
tend it well. And this is not to mention the likelihood that our 
experience and results will in turn prove to be of interest and 
value to our colleagues in biblical studies, all the more so if  
we consciously think of our task also in these terms.
These opportunities present themselves in many dimensions. 
As I was preparing these remarks on lying in Buddhist thought, 
I was struck by Kant’s observation in his Metaphysics of Morals 
that “telling an untruth intentionally, even though merely 
frivolously, is usually called a lie, because it can also harm 
someone”.27 While Kant goes on, for his own reasons, to offer a 
different definition of a lie, the similarity of what he terms the 
common definition to the Buddhist formulation I cited earlier is 
interesting. An enormous amount has been written about Kant’s 
views on lies, as on all else, but none of this, to my knowledge, so 
much as tangentially refers to Buddhist ideas. I hasten to insist 
that I have no wish to return to the bad old days when Buddhist 
philosophical texts were read through a Kantian lens. Buddhism 
must be understood in the first place on Buddhist terms, and 
Buddhist scholars must do their part to bring Buddhist materials 
into wider discussions. I do not wish in this or any other context 
to judge what Buddhist authors have to say, neither to criticize 
them, nor to praise them for their anticipation of modern 
so-called discoveries. I only wish to have their ideas take their 
rightful place in the larger conversation.
And this brings me to the next point: Buddhism surely exists 
as much in the present as it does in the past, it changes and 
evolves, and we can ignore neither the past nor the present 
if we hope for an organic appreciation of the tradition. 
Contemporary Buddhists can and should be both our collea-
gues and our resources in our scholarly endeavors. In his own 
Oratie delivered here - on this very podium - over 50 years ago, 
the first incumbent of the chair I am now honored to occupy, 
Jan Willem de Jong, lamented that in the past non-Japanese 
scholars had not sufficiently appreciated the work of their 
Japanese colleagues. He went on to observe, however, what  
he called a “noticeable change” in this regard.28 I am afraid  
that Prof. de Jong was being somewhat over-optimistic. To 
be sure, scholars of East Asian Buddhism are keenly aware of 
the importance of Japanese work, but even now quite few of 
those who focus on India, Tibet, Sri Lanka or Southeast Asia 
take the trouble to study the Japanese language. On the other 
hand, Prof. de Jong was right in observing even 50 years ago 
“a growing tendency” among Japanese scholars to make their 
work more accessible by publishing in English. Most of these 
scholars, moreover, are themselves Buddhist priests. Our inter-
action with these colleagues cannot and should not ignore 
this. Buddhism is an object of study from one viewpoint, 
simultaneously a foundation of life from another. 
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In this regard, it continues to puzzle me that I quite often 
encounter an unwillingness to acknowledge Buddhism as a 
religion. This is related, I think, to a refusal to take Buddhism 
seriously. I would be a happy man had I a nickel - that’s a small 
denomination American coin - for every time I have been 
told that Buddhism is not a religion, but rather a philosophy, 
a way of life. This is more than a rhetorical strategy by which 
an interested Westerner allows himself to explore Buddhism 
without feeling an apostate for doing so. For it derives its 
validity only by denying Buddhist traditions their intrinsic 
identity, and Buddhists - traditional, Asian Buddhists - their 
autonomy. Once one denies that Buddhism is a religion, 
it ceases to be an integral part of anyone’s life. Buddhism 
becomes something optional, adventitious, incidental even to 
the people whose lives it structures. For Westerners disaffected 
with religion, this may be a happy solution. But at least for 
the scholar, it is an impossibility, for it constitutes a refusal to 
acknowledge the tradition in its multiplicity and complexity, 
or even in its most intrinsic nature. At the same moment,  
why and how Buddhism, even if transformed, is gaining 
ground in the West is also an important topic of inquiry  
in its own right.
The study of Buddhism in the university will therefore involve 
both an appreciation for its past and for its present. It will 
communicate with contemporary Buddhists, and it will engage 
the literature of those who lived centuries and even millennia 
ago. The fundamental requirements for such a study include 
solid linguistic competences, historical and cultural awareness, 
unbridled curiosity and imagination, and, of course, plenty of 
sitzfleisch. It also requires an environment in which such study 
and research are supported and actively encouraged. 
Recent circumstances prompt me to be direct. The only way 
to attract and - dare I say it? - to retain qualified staff is to 
acknowledge - with deeds, and not just with words - the right ful 
place of the study of Buddhism in any humanistic curriculum, 
for precisely the reasons I have outlined a few moments ago. 
If one wants to acknowledge the study of Buddhism as a field 
worthy of a Chair, as my appointment suggests is indeed the case,  
one cannot expect it to act merely as a handmaiden to other 
studies. To be sure, teaching in Buddhism can and should 
support wider agendas in a Faculty of Arts, in East-Asian 
Studies, in Religion, in Art History, and so on. But without 
concrete support, encouragement and appreciation of the 
study in its own right, it will wither and die. The promise of 
dynamic synergies with other fields will be possible only if  
the Buddhist Studies program is itself vital and vibrant. 
My own main field of research is Indian Buddhism. For my 
research and advanced teaching to be possible, Indian Studies 
must prosper. Concrete support for the Chair consequently 
means that sufficient staff must be available to teach the 
languages and other skills requisite to the study of India, 
that students, and particularly graduate students, must be 
supported and funded, and that research must be enabled.  
To make this possible, we - staff and administrators together 
- will need to look beyond conventional funding models for 
creative means to ensure that Buddhist Studies flourish. It is 
precisely the unique nature of my chair in this country, the 
centrality of it in Leiden’s research foci on Asia and World  
Religions, and the fact that potential strong partners abound 
in the Buddhist world that make me confident of the creation 
of an environment conducive to the flourishing of the field. 
I therefore look forward to leading an invigorated and 
invigorating program in the Study of Buddhism at Leiden 
Lies, Slander and the Study of Buddhism
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University, one in which undergraduate studies, focused 
graduate work and world-class research symbiotically sustain 
our learning, forge new alliances with colleagues near and far, 
and lead us toward new insights, toward an ever-deepening 
understanding, not only of the tradition we study, but also 
between those of us in the academy and those living in the 
world we seek to comprehend.
I would like to - I must - in the very first place thank my 
beloved Mother and Father. Mere words can in no way express 
my infinite debt to them, one which I could not repay even 
were I, following a Buddhist image, to carry them about on 
my shoulders for a hundred years. They have supported and 
encouraged me even, or especially, when it was unclear that 
there would be much reward at the end of the trek. 
To my wife and partner Yoko, you’ve stuck by me through thick 
and thin - and far too much thin, I’m afraid. You’ve sacrificed 
your own career for my sake and for the sake of our sons, twice 
over becoming a stranger in a strange land. I cannot express suf-
fi ciently my gratitude for your love and support: 誠に有り難う. 
To our boys Benjamin and Oliver. You’ve been very good today 
- you see, I wrote that in my speech because I knew you would 
be good. You guys make every day a delight. When I’m with 
you, I can’t get any work done - and I thank you for that too. 
Goed gedaan!
Colleagues and coworkers in the Kern Institute, Professors 
Vetter and Griffiths, and all those in the department of Indian 
and Tibetan Studies, the Faculty of Arts, and beyond who 
worked to make my appointment possible, to welcome me 
and make me feel I belong, thank you. I deeply appreciate 
the environment you have created, and your dedication and 
passion to making the study and teaching of Buddhism in 
Leiden a success. To the deans and former deans who have 
supported this position, Deans Booij, Drees and van den  
Doel, I thank you for your backing, guidance, and friendship. 
I must also certainly and emphatically mention with profound 
gratitude the Gonda Foundation, and the members of its 
board of directors, whose financial contribution insured the 
continuation of the chair. 
A special thank you too to those whom I have met since 
coming to Leiden, colleagues, students and neighbors, who 
have helped us begin to feel at home here. 
Institutions are people, and also more than people. I would 
like, therefore, to take this opportunity to emphasize how very 
essential to my work, both my research and my teaching, are 
the resources of the world-renowned Kern Institute Library.  
Its splendid holdings, and the liberal manner in which it makes 
them available in an open-stack system, should be models for 
other similar specialist libraries. Its professional and highly 
qualified staff makes every visit a profitable pleasure. In fact, 
since truth is the order of the day, I should confess that I was  
familiar with the Kern Institute long before I had any aware-
ness of Leiden University as a whole. To be able to work down 
the hall from such a library, which I use on an almost daily 
basis, is indeed a privilege. 
Finally, I cannot fail to remember on this occasion my revered 
teacher Gadjin M. Nagao, whose scholarship and humanity  
is always before me as a beacon, although he is no more in  
this world. 
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It is thanks to these and many, many other wonderful people 
that I feel as if I am indeed, though a dwarf, standing on the 
shoulders of giants - and that’s no lie.
Ik heb gezegd
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Buddhist Holy Scriptures in the Pāli Language. Vol. 1 (London: 
Williams and Norgate, 1879): XL n. 1. The sutta is Majjhima Nikāya 
61, Ambalatṭṭhikārāhulovāda-sutta, edited by Vilhelm Trenckner  
in The Majjhima-Nikāya. Vol. 1 (London: The Pali Text Society, 
1888): 414-420, translated in English by Isaline Blew Horner,  
The Collection of the Middle Length Sayings (Majjhima-nikāya). 
Vol. 2 (London: The Pali Text Society, 1957): 87-90; Bhikkhu 
Ñāṇamoli, edited and revised by Bhikkhu Bodhi, The Middle 
Length Discourses of the Buddha: A New Translation of the 
Majjhima Nikāya (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 1995): 523-526.
6 By Sylvain Lévi in “Notes sur Diverses Inscriptions de Piyadasi,” 
Journal Asiatique, Series 9, vol 7 (1896): 475-485, “Le Lâghulovâda 
de l’Édit de Bhabra.” The text is Madhyamāgama 14, T. 26 (I) 
436a12-437b23 (juan 3). 
7 For instance in the Mahāyāna scripture Kāśyapaparivarta §4.
8 Erik Zürcher, The Buddhist Conquest of China: The Spread and Adap-
tation of Buddhism in Early Medieval China. Sinica Leidensia 11. 3rd  
ed. (Leiden: Brill, 2007): 29-30. Urs App, however, brings to my atten-
tion the study of Okabe Kazuo 岡部和雄 which, building on the  
work of others, demonstrates that the sūtra as a whole was con struc-
ted in the 4th or 5th century from various sources. See “‘Shijūnis hō­
kyō’ no seiritsu to tenkai: kenkyūshiteki oboegaki” 『四十二章』 の成
立と展開 研究史的 おぼえがき [The formation and development 
of the Sūtra in 42 Sections], Komazawa Daigaku Bukkyōgakubu 
Kenkyū Kiyō 駒澤大學佛教學部研究紀要 25 (1967): 103-118.
9 The translation is modified from that in Robert Sharf, “The Scrip-
ture in Forty-two Sections,” in Donald S. Lopez, Jr., ed., Religions of 
China in Practice (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996): 365.
10 In Christian Louis Joseph De Guignes, Histoire générale des Huns,  
des Turcs, des Mogols et des autres Tartares Occidentaux. Avant et 
depuis J. C. Jusqu’à présent. Précédée d’une Introduction contenant 
des Tables Chronologiques & Historiques des Princes qui ont régné 
dans l’Asie. Ouvrage tiré des Livres Chinois & des Manuscrits Orien-
taux de la Bibliothèque du Roi. Suite des Mémoires de l’Academie  
Royale des inscriptions & Belles-Lettres. Tome Premier, Seconde  
Partie (Paris: Desaint et Saillant, 1756): 227-233. I learned of the  
importance of this work from the studies of Urs App, “Schopen-
Notes
1 Jātaka 431 (Hārita), edited in Michel Viggo Fausbøll, The Jātaka, 
Together with Its Commentary (London: Trübner & Co., 1877-1896): 
iii.496-501, translated in Edward Byles Cowell et al., The Jātaka, 
or Stories of the Buddha’s Former Births (Cambridge, 1895-1907; 
reprint, London: The Pali Text Society, 1981): iii.295–297. I have 
discussed this story from a different point of view in chapter 16 of 
my forthcoming Riven By Lust: Incest and Schism in Indian Buddhist 
Legend and Historiography (University of Hawaii Press, 2008).
2 In Fausbøll’s edition on p. 499, lines 5-8. 
3 This is the so-called Calcutta-Bairāṭ or Bhābrā edict, discovered - 
or rediscovered - in 1840. For a recent bibliography (still partial,  
however, not only omitting all Japanese sources, but also some 
relevant Western materials), see Harry Falk, Aśokan Sites and 
Artefacts-A Source-book with Bibliography. Monographien 
zur indischen Archäologie, Kunst und Philologie 18 (Mainz: 
Philipp von Zabern, 2006): 106-108. For a convenient edition 
and translation, see U. Schneider, “The Calcutta-Bairāṭ Edict of 
Aśoka,” in L. A. Hercus et al., eds., Indological and Buddhist Studies: 
Volume in Honour of Professor J. W. de Jong on his Sixtieth Birthday 
(Canberra: Faculty of Asian Studies, 1982): 491-498. 
4 For some examples, see Hirakawa Akira 平川彰, “Ashōka-ō  
no nanashu no kyōmei yori mita genshi kyōten no seiritushi”  
アショーカ王の七種の經名より見た原始經典の成立史 
[Historical Development of Early Sūtras Seen through Seven  
Sūtras Mentioned in the Aśoka Edicts], Indogaku Bukkyōgaku 
Kenkyū 印度學佛教學研究 7/2 (1959): 279-289 (674-684); Tsuka-
moto Keishō 塚本啓祥, “Ashōka-ō no nanashu no hōmon ni kanren 
shite” アショーカ王の七種の法門に関連して [On the seven texts 
of King Aśoka], Bukkyō Kenkyū 佛教研究 1 (1970): 29-47; Lambert 
Schmithausen, “An Attempt to Estimate the Distance in Time 
between Aśoka and the Buddha in Terms of Doctrinal History,” 
in Heinz Bechert, ed., The Dating of the Historical Buddha / Die 
Datierung des historischen Buddha. Abhandlungen der Akademie 
der Wissenschaften in Göttingen, Phil-hist. Klasse 194 (Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1992): 110-147.
5 By Hermann Oldenberg, The Vinaya Piṭakaṁ: One of the Principal 
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hauers Begegnung mit dem Buddhismus,” Schopenhauer-Jahrbuch 
79 (1998): 35-56, and “How Amida Got into the Upanishads: An 
Orientalist’s Nightmare,” in Christian Wittern and Shi Lishan, eds., 
Essays on East Asian Religion and Culture: Festschrift in honour of 
Nishiwaki Tsuneki on the occasion of his 65th birthday / Nishiwaki 
Tsuneki kyōju taikyū kinen ronshū Higashi Ajia no Shūkyō to Bunka 
西脇常記教授退休記念論集「東アジアの宗教と文化」 (Kyoto: 
Editorial committee for the Festschrift in honour of Nishiwaki 
Tsuneki, 2007): 11-33 (450-428).
11 Simon de La Loubère, Description du Royaume de Siam, Où l’on 
voit quelles sont les opinions, les mœurs & la Religion des Siamois; 
avec plusieurs remarques de Physique touchant les Plantes & les 
Animaux du païs (Paris: La Veuve de Jean Baptiste Coignard et 
Jean Baptiste Coignard; Amsterdam: Abraham Wolfgang, 1691 - 
reprinted: Amsterdam: Henry & la Veuve de Theodore Boon, 1700; 
Gerard Onder de Linden, 1713; David Mortier, 1714). In English:  
A New Historical Relation of the Kingdom of Siam, translated by  
A. P. Gen. R. S. S. (London: Tho. Horne, Francis Saunders and  
Tho. Bennet, 1693 - the modern reprint in photographic repro-
duction is Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1969): 1.126.
12  In Chapter 4 of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya; see Prahlad Pradhan, 
Abhidharmakośa bhāṣyam of Vasubandhu. Tibetan Sanskrit  
Works 8 (Patna: K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute, 1975): 218.9-15: 
 atha kasmāt mṛṣāvādād viratir evopāsakasaṁvaraśikṣāpadaṃ  
na paiśunyādiviratiḥ | ebhir eva ca tribhiḥ kāraṇaiḥ | mṛṣāvādāti-
garhyatvāt saukaryād akriyāptitaḥ |
      mṛṣāvādaprasaṅgāc ca sarvaśikṣāvyatikrame | (34ab) 
sarvatra hi śikṣātikrame samanuyujyamānasyopasthitam idaṁ 
bhavati nāham evam akārṣam* iti mṛṣāvādasya prasaṅgo bhavaty 
ato mṛṣāvādād viratir vidhīyate | 
 * Pradhan prints ahārṣam, which is corrected here with Funahashi 
Issai 舟橋一哉, Kusharon no Genten Kaimei Gobon 倶舎論の
原典解明 業品 (Kyoto: Hōzōkan 法蔵館, 1987): 192 n. 1, who 
refers to Tib. ma byas so and Chinese 不作. Without access to the 
manuscript, I do not know whether ahārṣam is a genuine reading 
or a misprint in Pradhan’s edition. 
13 Padmanabh S. Jaini, Abhidharmadīpa with Vibhāṣāprabhāvṛtti. 
Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series 4 (Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal 
Research Institute, 1977): 128.6-8. 
14 Ārya-bodhisattvagocara-upāyaviṣayavikurvāṇanirdeśa = Ārya-
satyakaparivarta, sTog Kanjur 246, mdo sde, la 54a3-b1; Derge 
Kanjur 146, mdo sde, pa 117b7-118a4: rgyal po chen po khyod de ltar 
gtum pa | de ltar kho ba | de ltar zhe sdang ba | de ltar gzu lums1 can 
gyi spyan sngar bdag ’di ltar yang dag pa ji lta ba bzhin du smra ba 
ni |2 bdag kyang ha cang ngor ro bar smra ba lags te | bdag ni de khon 
smra bar gyur to || rgyal po chen po mkhas pas ni dus thams cad du 
yang dar pa ji lta ba bzhin du3 smra bar mi bgyi’o || rgyal po chen po 
mkhas pas ni dus dang dus ma lags pa dang | yul dang yul ma lags  
pa ’tshal par bgyi’o || de ci’i slad du zhe na | rgyal po chen po yang 
dag par smra ba ni ’jig rten yid mi bde zhing mi dga’ bar ’gyur te | des  
pa rnams kyis mi bsngags shing |2 glen pa’i skye bo rnams zhe sdang 
bar ’gyur ba’i slad du’o || gang zhig yang dag smra bgyid cing || smra 
dus dus min ma ’tshal ba || de ni mkhas pas smad ’gyur na || ’jig rten 
gzhan lta ci zhig smos || de bas bden pa’i tshig lags kyang || blo ldan 
kun tu smra mi bgyi4 || bdag kyang ’dir ni ’di lta bur || bden smas 
rang la gnod par gyur || 1) S lum 2) D ø | 3) S ø du 4) S bgyid
 The Chinese translation in T. 272 (IX) 341c13-342a9 (juan 5)  
differs slightly. 
15 I borrow this example from Michael Pye, Skilful Means: A Concept 
in Mahayana Buddhism. 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2003): 137. 
16 There is a substantial literature on this topic. For a short example 
with good references, see Yusho Wakahara, “The Truth-utterance 
(satyavacana) in Mahāyāna Buddhism,” Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū 56 
(2002): 58-69. On the Vedic background, see George Thompson, 
“On Truth-acts in Vedic,” Indo-Iranian Journal 41 (1998): 125-153. 
17 Surveys of Buddhist ethics, for instance, generally offer merely a 
few pages in a discussion of the Five Precepts. A somewhat more 
detailed examination, although with an emphasis on lying about 
one’s spiritual attainments, is given by Sugimoto Takushū 杉本
卓洲, “Mōgokai to shōninhō” 妄語戒と上人法 [The rule against 
lying and the attainments of a sage], Naritasan Bukkyō Kenkyūjo 
Kiyō 成田山仏教研究所紀要 11 (Bukkyō Shisōshi Ronshū  
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仏教思想論集 I) (1988): 141-170; reprinted in Gokai no shūhen: 
Indoteki sei no dainamizumu 五戒の周辺: インド的生のダイナミズム 
(Kyoto: Heirakuji shoten 平楽寺書店, 1999): 217-249.
18 I have discussed this example in detail in “Incestuous Ancestries: 
On the Family Origins of Gautama Siddhārtha, Interpretations  
of Genesis 20.12, and the Status of Scripture in Buddhism,”  
History of Religions 47/4 (2008): 253-281.
19 The translation is that of Jacob Milgrom, Leviticus 17-22. Anchor 
Bible 3A (New York: Doubleday, 2000): 1298; see also p. 1631. 
20 Babylonian Talmud, Bava Metzia 58b, translated in Adin Steinsaltz, 
The Talmud: The Steinsaltz Edition. Vol. 3. Tractate Bava Metzia, 
Part III (New York: Random House, 1990): 226.
21 Babylonian Talmud, Arachin 15b.
22 Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Teshuva 3:14. For a translation, see  
http://www.panix.com/~jjbaker/MadaT.html, translation 
copyright Immanuel M. O’Levy, 1993.
23 Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Deiot 7:5. The translation is from  
http://www.torah.org/learning/halashon/review1.html. See also 
http://www.panix.com/~jjbaker/MadaD.html, translation  
copy right Immanuel M. O’Levy, 1993. 
24 I do not know that there exists any “original source” for this  
tale, which I retell here based on the renditions I have seen. 
25 Chaim Milikowsky, “The Status Quaestionis of Research in 
Rabbinic Literature,” Journal of Jewish Studies 39 (1988): 206-207, 
the same remark repeated eleven years later in “Further on Editing 
Rabbinic Texts,” The Jewish Quarterly Review 90/1-2 (1999): 137.
26 Emanuel Tov, The Text-Critical Use of the Septuagint in Biblical 
Research. 2nd ed. Jerusalem Biblical Studies 3 (Jerusalem: Simor, 
1997): 90-99.
27 6.239, in the note, in Mary Gregor, trans., The Metaphysics  
of Morals (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996): 31. 
28 “The Study of Buddhism. Problems and Perspectives,” in 
Perala Ratnam, ed., Studies in Indo-Asian Art and Culture 4, 
Commemoration Volume on the 72nd Birthday Anniversary of 
Acharya Raghuvira. Śata-piṭaka 223 (New Delhi: International 
Academy of Indian Culture, 1975): 20, reprinted in Gregory 
Schopen, ed., Buddhist Studies (Berkeley: Asian Humanities 
Press, 1979): 22. This is an English version of De Studie van het 
Boeddhisme. Problemen en Perspectieven (The Hague: Mouton & 
Co., 1956): 14.
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